On Freedom and Incompleteness: Exploring a Possible Mechanistic Dualistic View of Metaphysical Freedom

Garry B. Tabugon, Marlon Jesspher de Vera

Abstract


In this paper we invoke the notion of incompleteness and examine its connections with the conception of metaphysical freedom, as well as with other consequent and related notions and problems such as the idea of ethical truth. In doing so, we consequently explore a possible mechanistic dualistic view of metaphysical freedom. This paper is divided into three main sections according to the line of discussion we wish to pursue. First, we shall discuss the notion of incompleteness by invoking the idea of incomplete ranking from social choice theory as a starting point. Second, we shall connect the discussions in the first section to discussions on a possible conception of freedom as metaphysically fundamental, which is similar to or and even to some extent related to the idea of consciousness as ontologically basic. Also in this second section, we shall discuss more elaborately the conjecture of a mechanistic dualistic view of metaphysical freedom. Lastly, in the third and last section, we shall discuss some implications of the ideas developed in the first two sections to other consequent and related notions and problems such as the problem of ethical truth.

Keywords


metaphysical freedom; incomplete ordering; positive vs metaphysical freedom; consciousness; dualistic view; freedom and ethics

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References


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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.